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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooooOoooo
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 930725-CA

JAMES B. CASE,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
-oooooOoooooSTATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over appeals from the Circuit
Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(d)

(1992).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Were the circumstances and information available to the
police officer who stopped Mr.Case's car sufficient to create a
reasonable suspicion for the stop?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The results of trial court determinations of reasonable
suspicion are reviewable nondeferentially for correctness. State
v. Pena. 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6-7 (Utah 1994).

But due to the

fact specific nature of such determinations, the Utah Supreme
Court has also concluded that trial judges retain a "measure of

1

discretion" in applying the "reasonable suspicion" legal standard
to the facts of a case. Id.
With respect to purely factual determinations, such as those
"underlying the trial court's decisions to grant or deny a motion
to suppress evidence . . . ," the review is for clear error only.
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) (cited in Pena at 8 n.4).
"[I]t will never be appropriate for an appellate court to overturn
a trial court's factual determinations when they have substantial
record support." Pena at 8 n.4.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following pertinent provisions are set forth in Addendum
D:

the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States;

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended);

and Article I, § 7

and §14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant James B. Case was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol on June 26, 1992.

Through counsel, he later

filed a motion to suppress evidence which asserted that the stop
which led to Mr. Case's arrest was not supported by reasonable
suspicion.
On September 24, 1992, at a hearing on this issue, the trial
court heard testimony from the University of Utah police officer
who had stopped Mr. Case's car.

Following this hearing, the

parties submitted legal memoranda to the court, and the motion was
subsequently denied on November 9, 1992.

The trial judge's bases

for denying the defense motion were put on the record at that

2

time.

The judge signed the "Findings of Fact & Conclusions of

Law" on December 23, 1992, and the "Supplemental Findings of Fact
& Conclusions of Law" on January 11, 1993.
Mr. Case then entered a guilty plea on February 22, 1993, but
reserved the right to appeal the reasonable suspicion issue under
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988).

Because sentencing

was stayed pending appeal, the original appeal of this matter was
dismissed due to the lack of a final judgment.

Sentencing took

place on October 14, 1993, imposition of which was stayed pending
this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Between two and three o'clock in the morning on June 26,
1992, two officers of the University of Utah Police Department
received a radio dispatch concerning a suspected car prowl or
automobile burglary-

Officer John LeFevre and Officer Denise

Bradfield were directed to the 100 Court area of University
Village at the University of Utah in order to investigate the
complaint which had been relayed to them. (See Addendum A, "Motion
to Suppress Transcript" at 1-3, 14-17 (hereinafter "MTr.").)

The

dispatch had described the suspect as a "chunky male, possibly
Hispanic, wearing a white t-shirt."

(See MTr. at 2.

See also

Addendum C, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1 2
(hereinafter "FFCL").)
Officer Bradfield was the first to arrive at the 100 Court
area, where she " check [ed] out an individual on foot" in that
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vicinity.1

(MTr. at 16.)

Afterward, she joined with Officer

LeFevre to assist him as backup officer. (MTr. at 15.)
Responding to the dispatch, a short distance from the 100
Court area on his patrol motorcycle, Officer LeFevre took note of
a passenger riding in a gold Trans Am.

The car's location and

direction suggested that it might have been coming from
Court area, the vicinity of the suspected car prowl.
the passenger appeared

the 100

Furthermore,

to fit the suspect described

in the

dispatch. (MTr. at 2.)
That passenger was later identified as Richard Farnsworth.
(MTr. at 7-8, 29; FFCL 5 7.)

At 5 feet 6 inches and 184 pounds,

Mr. Farnsworth was in fact "chunky," and, although not Hispanic,
"in the dark and at a distance could have looked Hispanic with his
dark hair and moustache."2 (See Addendum B, "Ruling Transcript" at
4 (hereinafter "RTr.").)

He was also wearing a light-colored t-

shirt which was visible to Officer LeFevre beneath an unzipped
jacket.3 (MTr. at 4, 9-10, 29; FFCL 19.)
1

Contrary to the assertion on page 5 of the Brief of Appellant,
this individual was never described to the court by Officer
Bradfield. There is no reference in any part of the record to
this person's appearance, to his or her gender, to the length of
this prior detention, to the extent of police questioning of this
person, or to Officer Bradfield's reasons for allowing this person
to leave. (MTr. at 14-17.)
2 This underlying, factual determination, of course, was made by
the trial judge after sitting in the same courtroom as Mr.
Farnsworth and watching him testify. The Brief of Appellant, in
footnote 2 of page 6, refers to the court's acknowledgement that
Mr. Farnsworth is not actually Hispanic. Yet after looking at Mr.
Farnsworth and making the relevant factual determination, the
court came to the opposite conclusion as the Defendant, and stated
that the officer was "not acting on some hunch . . . . " (See
Addendum B, "Ruling Transcript" at 4 (hereinafter "RTr.")
(emphasis added).)
3 Although Defendant goes to some length to establish the shirt's
actual color as pink (Br. of Appellant at 5-6), the trial judge
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Thinking that Mr. Farnsworth, the passenger in the passing
Trans Am, was the subject of the dispatch, Officer LeFevre
initiated a traffic stop near the entrance to University Village
at Sunnyside Boulevard. (MTr. at 2, 29; FFCL 91 10.)

The officer

approached Mr. Farnsworth and, during a brief, initial detention,
determined that he had legitimate business in the University
Village area and was not involved in a car prowl or automobile
burglary. (MTr. at 2.)

During this contact, Officer Bradfield

arrived at the scene of the stop.
"did appear

In her opinion Mr. Farnsworth

to fit the description"

dispatch. (MTr. at 15.)

of the suspect

in the

In fact, according to Officer Bradfield,

it was "determined that the individual that [they] were looking
for was the passenger [Mr. Farnsworth] and that [he] had a valid
reason for being in that area." (MTr. at 17 (emphasis added).)
However, while speaking to Mr. Farnsworth and the driver of
the Trans Am, the Defendant James B. Case, Officer LeFevre was
exposed to evidence "in plain view and plain smell [which] gave
rise to additional suspicions which the officer then acted upon."
The Defendant and Appellant, James B. Case, was subsequently
arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. (MTr. at 30;
FFCL 1 13.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The

information

available

to the officer

stopping

the

Defendant was a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion under
the

"totality

of

the

circumstances"

test,

justifying

an

described the shirt for the record saying it "looks like the tshirt is white." (MTr. at 5.)
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investigatory stop.
specific

A report of possible "car prowling" in a

geographic

area,

combined

with

a

basic

physical

description of a suspect and the clothing worn, suffice to create
"reasonable suspicion" meriting investigation.
was

received

as

the

result

of

an

That information

anonymous

phone

call.

Corroboration of an anonymous phone call, through the personal
observations of an investigating police officer, can provide the
required "indicia of reliability".

The degree of detail required

and the exact extent of the required "match" between description
and suspect is not a rigid standard, especially in the context of
an officer conducting an investigation into the merits of a
dispatch.

Here, the passenger of the Defendant can reasonably be

considered to have fallen within the scope of the description.

An

investigatory stop of a vehicle leaving the area with a passenger
who appeared to meet the dispatch description - in an effort to
"maintain the status quo" in the course of the investigation - was
justifiable

and reasonable, and did not violate

the Fourth

Amendment.
ARGUMENT
The Defendant's arguments are divisible into two categories.
The first concerns alleged discrepancies between the description
of the suspect as communicated by dispatch, and the passenger's
actual appearance at the time of the stop.

These discrepancies

are asserted primarily in the "Statement of Facts" of the Brief of
Appellant, and in section D of the
category

revolves

around

"Argument".

the sufficiency

of

the

The second
dispatch's

information in order to create a reasonable suspicion for the
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stop.

We will discuss the alleged factual discrepancies first,

since it is of tantamount importance that we know what the facts
are before drawing legal conclusions based on those facts.
I. THE TRIAL COURT MADE FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH APPLY IN
THIS CASE# AND WHICH MUST NOT BE DISREGARDED WITHOUT A
SHOWING OF CLEAR ERROR.
Search and seizure issues, in particular, are highly fact
sensitive. State v. Lopez, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10 (Utah 1994).
Such is the case here, where a police officer's perceptions are
presented for appellate review only through the trial judge's
assessment of an individual's physical characteristics.

Once such

underlying factual determinations are made, they must be accepted
as facts unless and until they are shown to be clearly erroneous.
"[I]t will never be appropriate for an appellate court to overturn
a trial court's factual determinations when they have substantial
record support." Pena at 8 n.4.
Despite the assertion on page 18 of the Brief of Appellant
that the passenger did not match the description given in the
dispatch,

this

is

contrary

to

the

trial

determinations as presented by the record.

judge's

factual

The trial judge

stated, on the record, that the passenger was "chunky" (RTr. at
2), with a "moderate complexion" (RTr. at 2), and that "in the
dark and at a distance [he] could have looked Hispanic with his
dark hair and moustache" (RTr. at 4).

In addition, the trial

judge stated that the passenger's t-shirt, albeit pink on closer
inspection, "looks . . . white", (MTr. at 5) and furthermore, that
the shirt "would have been visible to the officer who made the
stop" (RTr. at 2).
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Nevertheless, the Defendant would have this court disregard
these factual determinations.

For instance, as discussed in

footnote 2, supra, at one point in

the Brief of Appellant, the

Defendant uses an out-of-context statement of the trial judge to
divert attention from the judge's actual assessment: that it was
reasonable for the police officer to think that the passenger fit
the description of "Hispanic".
The trial judge's factual findings, then, tell us that the
passenger in the Defendant's car matched the description received
via the dispatch.

From these findings, the trial judge went on to

draw a conclusion about the stop which falls within the "measure
of discretion" anticipated by the Utah Supreme Court in Pena.

The

trial judge concluded that "[b]ased on the description that the
Officer had received, it was reasonable to think that the vehicle
he was stopping contained the subject of the dispatch." (FFCL
111.)

In his verbal pronouncement, on the record, the judge was

even more specific: "[The police officer] wasn't acting on some
hunch.

He thought that the vehicle he was stopping contained the

subject of a dispatch . . . ." (RTr. at 3, # 1-3.)

See State v.

Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Terrv v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d

889

(1968), in that

reasonable suspicion cannot be based on "inarticulate hunches").
This is a conclusion which should not be subject to a "close, de
novo review" due to its high dependence on facts which only the
trial judge perceived in person.^ pena at 6.
4 The determination that the officer was not acting on a "hunch"
is actually more of a secondary finding of fact--based on the
original findings which applied the dispatch to physical
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II. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATE THAT THE
OFFICER'S STOP WAS BASED ON A REASONABLE SUSPICION.
A.

Reasonable Suspicion and Totality of the Circumstances.

The Fourth Amendment

to the United States Constitution

protects people not against all seizures, but against unreasonable
seizures. State v. Lopez. 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 11 (Utah 1994)
(citing Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).

To determine what

is or is not a reasonable seizure, "there is 'no ready test . . .
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the
invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.' " Terrv v. Ohio.
392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d

889

(1968)

(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court. 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)).
See also State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988).
But to avoid seizures based on "inarticulate hunches," there
are certain guidelines of analysis.

For instance, the United

States Supreme Court tells us that an objective question must be
asked while reviewing the specific facts of each case: "[W]ould
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or
the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that the action taken was appropriate?" Terrv at 392 U.S. 21-22,

appearances--than it is a conclusion of law. However, because it
is a finding of fact which by itself can determine the ultimate
legal conclusion, we must stress the need for trial court
discretion on such an issue. The Utah Supreme Court has adopted
the belief that "discretion ought to be left to a trial court . .
. when the trial judge has observed 'facts,' such as a witness's
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law
that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to
appellate courts." Pena at 6 (paraphrasing Professor Maurice
Rosenberg in Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court. Viewed From
Above. 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635 (1971)).
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88 S.Ct. 1880 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925), emphasis added).
Utah has adopted the "Terry" standards in a multitude of
cases which indicate that a stop is justified where there are
"specific,

articulable

facts which,

together

with

rational

inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person
to conclude" that a crime had been or was about to be committed by
the person stopped. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App.
1988) .

The

standard

has also been

codified

in Utah Code

Annotated, § 77-7-15 (1980):
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he
has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
In applying this standard, this court has previously determined
that since " [t]here is no bright line test for determining if
reasonable suspicion exists . . . [t]he courts must look at the
totality of the circumstances." State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40, 43
(Utah App. 1993).

See also United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1

(1989), and State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991).
B.

The Totality of the Circumstances Presented to Officer
LeFevre was Sufficient to Create a Reasonable Suspicion.

The dispatch information received by Officer LeFevre was
specific as to the location of the suspected car prowl or vehicle
burglary, directing him to a "common parking area at the 100 court
of the University Village." (FFCL 5 1.)

This information was

coupled with the description of a chunky male wearing a white tshirt who was possibly Hispanic.

But in order to look at the

totality of the circumstances, one must also consider the facts as
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perceived by Officer LeFevre in addition to the raw data he had
heard over the radio. Alabama v. white. 496 U.S. 328 (1990);
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
First upon arriving at the University Village area. Officer
LeFevre

discovered

that

a

person

description did in fact exist.

matching

the

suspect's

The officer had just listened to a

description of a possible crime suspect, and sure enough, someone
matching the description was there.

Second, that person was in

the general vicinity of the incident being investigated, and was
heading away from the specific location reported.
These perceptions, coupled with the raw data of the dispatch,
form the totality of the circumstances. Alabama v. White. 49 6 U.S.
at 330-32.

The defendant argues that the stop was made "prior to

attempting to corroborate any of the dispatch information." (Br.
of Appellant at 7.)

To the contrary: the officer's perceptions

just prior to making the stop had corroborated the dispatch
information in every particular.

With this corroboration in mind,

"the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure"
reasonably warranted the brief intrusion of a traffic stop. Terry
at 21-22.
Officer LeFevre did not have the opportunity to go to the
parking lot to look for witnesses or signs of vehicle burglary.
Yet, once he was on his way to the scene of the complaint, Officer
LeFevre was engaged in an investigation of a possible crime.

That

investigating officer made an on-the-spot observation of a suspect
leaving the scene.

In balancing the need to seize presented by

this situation against the relatively minor invasion constituted
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by a traffic stop,5 it is clear that the protections of the Fourth
Amendment were not violated.
In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 328 (1990), a case cited in the
Brief of Appellant on page 10, the United States Supreme Court
tells us that an anonymous tip, coupled with even incomplete
corroboration, can provide the "requisite quantum of suspicion."
Id. at 330.

That case concerned a Terry stop based on anonymous

information

that

a certain woman would

possession of cocaine.

be

found

to be in

The Court's totality of the circumstances

analysis concluded that while the tip by itself would not have
been enough, subsequent observations by the police "sufficiently
corroborated [the tip] to furnish reasonable suspicion." Id. at
331.

Central to the Court's finding in Alabama v. White was the

level of suspicion called for: "[T]he level of suspicion required
for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable
cause." Ifl, at 330 (quoting United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1,
7 (1989)).
C. The Defendant is Asking the Court to Ignore the Totality
of the Circumstances.
By reviewing each aspect of the stop separately, the Brief of
Appellant ignores the totality of the circumstances which led to
Officer LeFevre's reasonable suspicion.

First, the Appellant-

Defendant focuses on the anonymous nature of the call which was

5 Minor, that is, relative to the standard of probable cause. As
stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7 (1989): "The Fourth Amendment requires 'some minimal
level of objective justification* for making the stop. INS v.
Delcrado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 . . . (1984). That level of suspicion
is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance
of the evidence."
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the basis of the dispatch.

However, the anonymity of the caller,

by itself, does not make a dispatch inherently unreliable. Alabama
v. White, 496 U.S. at 328-32.

The need for caution in responding

to anonymous tips is due to the possibility of vindictive callers
who are attempting to harass or frame a specific individual.

And

as stated on page 13 of the Brief of Appellant, there are those
with

"misguided

services."

motives" who

will

"misuse

police

and

911

But in the case of calls which report only the

possibility of criminal acts, there is little risk of underlying,
vindictive motivation, since it is left to the officers to
determine who is or is not a suspect.

This low level of risk

should also be balanced against the level of intrusion involved in
a brief traffic stop.

Furthermore, as discussed above, the

combination of the dispatch's content with the police officer's
own corroborating observations acts to supply the "quantity and
quality"

of

information necessary

for reasonable

suspicion.

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 330.
The case situations presented in the Brief of Appellant are
distinguishable from the case at hand.
the Appellant-Defendant's

The primary analogies in

argument are cases where anonymous

callers' tips were not corroborated in any way by the responding
officers' observations.

For the most part, in fact, the officers'

observations would have discredited the information received.

In

Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety. 371 N.W.2d 552 (Minn.
1985), for instance, the reviewing court refers with approval to
another Minnesota case, Marben v. State, Dep't of Public Safety.
294 N.W.2d 697 (Minn. 1980), in noting that the officer in Marben
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responded to an anonymous tip "when he was in the immediate
vicinity . . . [and so] was able to verify the reliability of the
tip."

Olson at 556.

The Olson

court went on to suggest a

different outcome in the case before it if the officer had
"corroborated the anonymous tip and justified an investigative
stop." Id.
In State v. White. 856 P.2d 656

(Utah App. 1993), this

court's conclusions also centered on the lack of corroboration of
an anonymous tip.

In that case, the officer's observations

actually contradicted the information received from the informant,
as well as the officer's own "experience and expectations." White
at 666.
In the case at bar, the defendant's passenger fell reasonably
within the parameters of the description.

In State v. Bruce, 779

P.2d 646 (Utah 1989), an investigatory stop was ruled to be legal,
even though the police dispatch was inaccurate.

The police

dispatch in Bruce included a description of a car that could not
be linked to the crime other than having been unfamiliar to the
witness and having been seen leaving the area shortly after the
commission of the crime.

The witness did not see the individual

who committed the crime get into the described vehicle; indeed,
the witness did not see who was in the vehicle as it drove away.
Also, the police broadcast inaccurately described the car as
occupied by two individuals, even when no one had any idea how
many persons actually occupied the vehicle, or whether they were
in fact participants in the crime.

Where only one person had been

identified as committing the robbery, the broadcast indicated two
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persons were in the vehicle, Bruce at 648.

The Bruce court

concluded:
We find no error in the trial court's factual
evaluation underlying its decision to deny the motion to
suppress.
While the police officers who issued the
broadcast may have improperly placed two black males in
the front seat of the orange car, other sufficient
information was provided and "articulable facts" existed
to support at least a "reasonable suspicion" that the
robber of the store was in the orange car. Thus, the
stop was made in "objective reliance" on the broadcast,
which was issued by officers possessing "a reasonable
suspicion justifying a stop."
Bruce at 650-51.

The Defendant-Appellant indicates that a police

officer can establish reasonable suspicion by personally observing
criminal activity, or by receiving reliable information via radio
broadcast.

(Br. of Appellant at 10.)

Further, the Defendant

indicates that information contained in a broadcast bulletin must
be supported by reasonable suspicion.
Alabama v. White. discussed above:

Defendant cites from

"Reasonable suspicion . . . is

dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police
and its degree of reliability.

Both factors - quantity and

quality - are considered in the totality of the circumstances the whole picture." Alabama v. White at 330.
Defendant-Appellant

does not carry the "totality of the

circumstances" test far enough.

The Defendant-Appellant ignores

the importance of the fact that this is indeed a "totality of the
circumstances" test - "the whole picture".

And thus, the way all

the pieces of the puzzle fit together, and whether there are
enough pieces of the puzzle present to support a reasonable
suspicion, needs to include not only the quantity and quality of
the information broadcast to the officers, but also a reasonable
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linkage between

the

information broadcast

and

the personal

observations of the officers at the scene which connect to confirm
the reliability of the broadcast information.
between

"other sufficient

information"

That linkage

in the broadcast and

"articulable facts" personally observed by the officers combined
in Bruce to overcome the outright inaccuracy of the broadcast in
that case.
Defendant misinterprets the importance of Bruce for our
purposes here.

In his brief, Defendant suggests that Bruce

establishes some threshold for the detail required before an
investigatory stop is justified.

(Br. of Appellant at 15-16.)

Bruce does not tell us how much detail is enough, beyond reciting
the Terry standard. Bruce at 650. What Bruce does tell us is that
"other sufficient information" and observed "articulable facts"
may combine to support a "reasonable suspicion", even in the face
of a significant factual discrepancy between the broadcast and the
subject of the investigatory stop.

Thus, when the Appellant-

Defendant points to variation between the dispatch description and
the Appellant's passenger, the mere fact that there may have been
variation is not persuasive.

It is important to remember that the

trial court found that the passenger could have been perceived as
Hispanic-looking in the dark of night, and that the t-shirt was
such that it could have been perceived as white. (RTr. at 2, 4;
MTr. 5) .

As for sitting in a car and wearing a black leather

jacket over the t-shirt, these factual variations are no more
severe than those in Bruce, where the dispatch described a car
which had no connection to the crime other than the fact that it
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was seen leaving the area closely in time to the report, and
described two persons in the vehicle where in fact no one had seen
how many persons were in the vehicle.

Indeed, no one connected

with the crime was actually seen to have entered the vehicle that
was later stopped. Bruce at 648.
The Terrv standard is a "totality of the circumstances" test,
where "rational inferences" can generate "reasonable suspicion".
The case at hand is a Terrv

"rational inferences" stop:

"In

justifying the particular intrusion, 'the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.' Terry. 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880,
20 L.Ed.2d at 906." Bruce at 650.
and articulable facts, and

These criteria, (1) specific

(2) rational inferences from those

facts, are satisfied here as set forth above.
Bruce does indicate that:

"It is clear that police officers

'may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest.' Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 11, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20
L.Ed.2d 889, 906-07 (1968)." Bruce at 650. Terrv and Bruce. then,
give us three criteria for an investigatory stop: (1) appropriate
circumstances;
behavior.

(2) appropriate manner;

(3) possibly

criminal

Again, as set forth above, the facts of the case at

hand meet all three criteria.
What the officers observed at the scene here - an individual
reasonably fitting the broadcast description, in the area of
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suspected criminal activity, and within a reasonable time frame of
the broadcast report - confirmed the reliability of the anonymous
tip. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 330-31.

This, under the

"totality of the circumstances" test, should be viewed as a
sufficient basis for "reasonable suspicion".
In State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994), the court
held that an officer was not required to "allow a suspect who
matched the detailed description given by the store clerk to
continue until another officer had the opportunity to go to the 7Eleven store and interview the clerk." Pena at 7.

This should be

viewed as an expression of the policy rationale that, given a
physical description in the context of a possible crime, a police
officer is not required to search the area and confirm that a
crime has indeed been committed before being permitted to conduct
an investigatory stop of a vehicle containing an individual who
reasonable falls within the parameters of the description.
This position, that a suspect need not be permitted to
proceed pending confirmation of a crime, has been expressed
favorably by the United States Supreme Court:
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who
lacks the precise level of information necessary for
probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders
and allow a crime to occur or criminal to escape. On
the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the
essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate
response. . . .
A brief stop of a suspicious
individual, in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information, may be most reasonable in light of the
facts known to the officer at that time.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1922-23,
32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (emphasis added).
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This policy applies to

the case at hand.

On the night in question, Officer LeFevre took

a reasonable "intermediate" approach and "maintained the status
quo momentarily while obtaining more information" - a response
"most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at
that time".
CONCLUSION
The
sustain

State/Appellee
the

investigatory

conviction

respectfully
of

stop resulting

t o t a l i t y of t h e

the

requests

Defendant

from r e a s o n a b l e

that
as

this

based

court
on

an

suspicion under

the

circumstances.

Respectfully submitted t h i s

^

day of J u n e ,

1994.

LANGDON (FJSHER
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l e e
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SALT LAKE CITY V. JAMES CASE
TAPE NO. 1853
CASE NO. 925018713TC
JUDGE REESE
ATD: DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ
ATP: STEVEN ZOLLINGER

DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATP:

State your name for the record please.

A:

My name's Officer John LeFavre.

I'm a police officer

currently at the University of Utah Police Department.
Q:

And were you so employed on June 26th of this year?

A:

Yes, I was.

Q:

Were you working?

A:

Yes, I was.

Q:

Did you have occasion to respond to the University Village,

I believe on that date at approximately 2:00 in the morning?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning?

What caused you to

respond to that area?
A:

I was dispatched concerning a call on a possible car prowler

in the 100 court area at the University Village.
Q:

And was that dispatched through the normal procedure?

A:

Yes.

Q:

How does that occur?

A:

A dispatcher would receive a phone call or a complaint. The

dispatcher would assign one or more officers to the detail and they
would send us to the location of the complaint.
- 1-

Q:

On this particular occasion you stated you were dispatched

on the possible car prowl. Did they give you any indication of what
you were looking for?
A:

Yes, the information I was given from the dispatcher was a

description of a male, possibly hispanic, chunky in build wearing a
white t-shirt•
Q:

And upon arriving at the 100 Co'urt did you take any action?

A:

Yes, I did.

Q:

What action did you take?

A:

I saw a gold Firebird, I take it back it's a Pontiac leaving

the 100 Court area with two occupants, the passenger of which met the
description of the possible car prowler which the dispatch had given
me.
Q:

How did you perceive the passenger in his appearance?

A:

He looked male hispanic in his appearance. He appeared to

be chunky in build and he was wearing a white t-shirt.
Q:

On that basis did you stop the vehicle?

A:

Yes, I did.

Q:

And what did you discover when you stopped the vehicle?

A:

When I stopped the vehicle and talked to the occupants of

the car I found that the both occupants had a legitimate reason for
being in the 100 Court area. However, while speaking with the driver
I noted an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from within the car.
Q:

Upon closer observation of this passenger did he still

appear to meet, fit the description of the suspect?
A:

Yes.
- 2 -

Q:

Was that the sole basis for your stop?

A:

Yes.

Q:

I have no further questions.

JUDGE:

Alright, cross-examination.

CROSS - EXAMINATION
ATD:

Good morning officer. My name is Deborah Kreeck Mendez just

so we're on equal terms here, we both know each other's names.
Was anything else said in the dispatch call?
dispatch?

Who made the call to

Was that information given to you?

A:

I, from what I

Q:

Was that information given to you on that day?

ATP:

Your honor, I would object under the state law and the

recent U.S. Supreme Court law that it's not relevant who made the
call.

If he receives a dispatch from his dispatcher with subjective

facts he doesn't have to rely it's determined that the dispatcher
determined whether it was reliable.

His response is based on his

dispatch, not on who made the call.
ATD:
here.

Then your honor, I believe that the dispatch needs to be
The City's not produced the dispatch.

I need to determine

whether this was an anonymous phone call or a citizen's phone call.
JUDGE:

I don't know that it really hurts anybody if she asks the

question and he answers.
ATD:

I'll overrule the objection.

On that evening did you know over the dispatch did they say

who made the phone call?
A:

They did not give me a name.
- 3-

Q:

And you saw Mr. Case driving the gold Trans Am?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And for the record I would like to state that Mr. Case has

short dark-brown hair, he light and fair in complexion, he's about
135 pounds and 5'7n.
JUDGE:

Is that a question?

ATD:

I'm just reading into the record to preface this question so

the record will reflect the way he looks. Did you deem his to look
Hispanic?
A:

The driver?

Q:

Ya.

A:

No.

Q:

Or chunky?

A:

No.

Q:

He was not the person that you suspected?

A:

That's correct.

Q:

Will you please describe for me the passenger of the car as

specific detail as you can remember?
A:

From what I could see from my motorcycle the passenger

appeared to be Hispanic, appeared to be chunky in build and was
wearing a white t-shirt.
Q:

Would this be the t-shirt that he was wearing?

A:

I couldn't recall.

Q:

You can't recall?

JUDGE:

You need to have it referred to on the record so why don't

you have it marked.
- 4-

ATD:

That's what I was going to ask.

JUDGE:

Defense exhibit 1 is a t-shirt.

ATD:

It's a white t-shirt danned of psychedelic colors across the

top of it, logo, pink and purple logo on the right pocket.
JUDGE:

Is that correct officer?

I think she's asking that

question.
ATD:

Is that correct what this looks like?

A:

That seems to be a good description to me.

JUDGE:

For the record, looks like the t-shirt is white, it has a

band of what 4 or 5 inches in the middle and surrounding the t-shirt
and deep purple sort of floral pink and colors in there and gold as
well.
ATD:

I think it's grey instead of gold.

Do you know anything

else other than what you've told us about the informant on this phone
call?
A:

No.

Q:

Is there any details as to what the car prowl entailed given

to you?
A:

No.

Q:

Just a car prowl, the general term car prowl.

Is that what

was used?
A:

Yes.

I'm not sure whether they used the term car prowler or

a possible automobile burglary.

I'm not sure which it was.

Q:

That will be, all thank you.

JUDGE:

Any redirect?
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REDIRECT

ATP:

Just for clarification, you didn't identify this shirt

marked defense exhibit 1 as the shirt the individual you stopped was
wearing?
A:

No, sir, I couldn't identify that,

JUDGE:

Anything else?

ATP:

Nope.

ATD:

No, your honor.

JUDGE:

Let me just follow-up officer.

When you responded then what

you had heard from dispatch was that there was a car burglary or
something to that effect at the 100 Court area, is that correct?
A

There was a possible car prowler.

Q

And that was the location you were given?

A

Yes.

Q

And the only other information you had that the suspect was

chunky, was male, possibly Hispanic in a white t-shirt?
A:

That's correct.

Q:

So that's all you were going on when you arrived?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Okay, you may have a seat.

ATP:

The City has no further witnesses.

ATD:

Your honor, I have a witness,

JUDGE:

Alright.

ATP:

The State rests.

JUDGE:

Defense you may call your witness.

The City rest of State rests?

- 6-

DIRECT EXAMINATION

ATD:

Could you state your name for the record please.

A:

Richard Farnworth.

Q:

And could you state your address.

A:

124 T Street, Salt Lake City, DT.

Q:

What is your relation to Mr. Case?

A:

Cousin.

JUDGE:

Could you spell your last name, sir.

A:

Farnworth.

ATD:

On June 26 in the early morning hours were you with Mr.

Case?
A:

Yes, I was.

Q:

Where were you?

A:

Dropping his girlfriend off at University Village.

Q:

Which court would that be in?

A:

I'm not sure of the court number actually.

Q:

How tall are you?

A:

5'6" .

Q:

And how much do you weigh?

A:

About 184.

Q:

And what color is your hair?

A:

Brown.

Q:

And is it shoulder length?

A:

Ya.

Q:

Are you fair complected?
- 7-

A

I'd say so.

Q

And what color are your eyes?

A

Brown.

Q

On June 26 were you wearing this pink t-shirt?

A

Yes.

Q

I'm sorry let me back-up?

Were you a passenger in Mr.

Case's car at the time that he was stopped?
A

Yes, I was.

Q

Actually it's your car isn't it?

A

It is my car# yes.

Q

Is this your car?

A

The one on the left.

Q

That being the gold Trans Am with the black bra and the

Trans Am logo on the hood.
JUDGE:

What number is the exhibit?

ATD:

Four.

JUDGE:

You offering this?

ATD:

Yes.

JUDGE:

Any objection.

ATP:

No.

JUDGE:

Exhibit four will be received.

ATD:

And on that evening you were wearing this shirt?

describe this shirt for the record please.
A:

Pink t-shirt.

Q:

Does it have any writing on it?

A:

No, it doesn't.
- 8-

Will you

Q

Kind of tattered?

A

Ya, I'd say so.

Q

And this is your t-shirt?

A

That is mine.

Q

And how do you know you were wearing it on June 26?

A

Well, I'm pretty sure I was wearing it.

It has a few stains and spots on it.

I usually know what

I'm wearing when I'm wearing it.
Q:

I'd

this?

JUDGE

Objections?

ATP:

No, your honor.

JUDGE

Is this number two?

ATD:

Yes,

I think

it

is number two, no,

it's

three.

And over

that shirt what were you wearing?
A:

A leather jacket.

Q:

Would it be this black leather jacket?

A:

That's the jacket.

Q:

Would you describe this jacket for the record please.

A:

It's an open road leather jacket, lots of zippers and

Q:

Is it completely black?

A:

Yes.

Q:

I'd like to submit this to the record.

JUDGE:

Again, it's exhibit number?

ATD:

Exhibit number two.

JUDGE:

Is exhibit two the jacket you were wearing?

that's marked exhibit two?
WITNESS: Yes, that is.
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Is this the one

ATD:

And you were wearing that jacket on the evening and did you

have that jacket zipped up?
A:

No, I didn't.

JUDGE:

That will be received by the way the exhibit. And offered

no objections', is that correct?
ATP:

No objection, your honor.

ATD:

And wearing that jacket zipped up?

zipped up?

You weren't wearing it

How much of your pink shirt would you say was showing?

A:

As far as what?

I would say

Q:

In the car how much of it was?

A:

Probably four inches, five, six.

Q:

Okay.

JUDGE:

Pointing to the for the record to the chest area about what

six seven inches below the chin?
A:

Ya, probably about a foot or so. The thing is sittin in the

car it's pretty low.
JUDGE:

That's fine. The questions been answered.

ATD:

Had you been drinking on that evening?

A:

Yes, I had.

Q:

How much?

A:

I'd say in about a nine hour period I had probably a twelve

pack or so.
Q:

That's all, thank you.

CROSS - EXAMINATION
ATP:

Do you own the black jacket?
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A:

Yes, I do.

Q:

Did you bring it to the building today?

A:

Did I bring it to the building today?

Q:

It wasn't brought in by the defendant?

A:

Urn, as in Brian Case?

Q:

As in Mr. Case.

A:

No, it wasn't brought by him.

Q:

You carried it up and you brought it up in the elevator?

A:

I did.

Q:

Did Mr. Case at anytime have this jacket today?

A:

No, he didn't.

Q:

Does he have a similar jacket?

A:

No, he doesn't.

Q:

Did Mr. Case's girlfriend I think you referred to as?

A:

Ya.

Q:

Did she bring the jacket up?

A:

I just handed to her outside the door.

Q:

When did that occur?

A:

About five minutes ago.

Q:

After they came up in the elevator?

A:

Uh, no just before we came in the courtroom.

Yes, I did.

I was sitting

outside with it.
Q:

So Mr. Case didn't come up in the elevator with the black

leather jacket to the best of your knowledge?
A:

No, he didn't.

Q:

And the pink shirt that's with that jacket was it with the
- 11 -

jacket all the time?
JUDGE:

You mean this morning?

ATP:

Ya, this morning.

A:

Yes, it was.

Q:

How was it that you recall so specifically that you were

wearing that shirt on the the 26th?

When were you first asked to

recall what you were wearing that night?
A:

As in today or?

Q:

When were you first asked, did defense counsel ask you what

you were wearing that night?
A:

Yes, I did.

Q:

When did that occur?

A:

Three or four days ago.

Q:

Three or four days ago, that would make it about September

20, 21st and you recalled that you were wearing this pink shirt on
June 23?
A

Yes.

Q

How many t-shirts do you own?

A

Ten, twenty.

Q

Does this one have any particular sentimental value?

A

Ya, it does.

Q

And what would that be?

A

Actually, it goes good with black.

Q

Do you have other t-shirts that don't go good with black?

A

Ya, I have a few.

Q

I don't have any further questions, your honor.
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ATP:

Just a minute, your honor, I need to check some dates.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

ATP:

Rich, we're going to have to reconstruct.

Do you remember

coming in with Mr. Case to my office shortly after he was arraigned?
It would have been the 1st of September, the Monday after.

Have you

been to my office twice?
A:

Yes, I have.

Q:

And do you remember on that first meeting towards the first

of September at that time I asked you some questions about the
incident?
A:

You never did ask me anything the first time I was there.

Q:

I just couldn't remember what happened at that meeting.

When did you purchase this jacket?
A:

I'd say it was September of last year.

Q:

And has it been your jacket this whole time?

A:

The whole time.

Q:

What size is that jacket?

A:

Extra large.

Q:

Thank you.

ATP:

One follow-up.

June 26, do you recall how warm it was

outside?
A:

Ya, I do.

Q:

How warm was it?

A:

Probably 80 .
- 13 -

Q:

8 0 and you have this, is this leather jacket lined?

A:

Yes, it is.

Q:

And you had it on?

A:

Yes, I did.

Q:

In the car?

A:

Yes, I did.

Q:

No further questions.

JUDGE:

Alright, you can sit down, sir. Any other witnesses for the

defense?
ATD:

No, the defense rests.

JUDGE:

Alright, the City had the burden of going forward the

defense then has the burden of raising some issue as to whether or
not there was not to indicate that there was not an articulable
reasonable suspicion to stop and I think it the City's burden again
to convince the court by purponderence of the evidence that there was
a reasonable suspicion.
ATP:

We do have a rebuttle witness, Officer Bradford.

JUDGE:

Alright.

ATP:

Officer, could you state your name and your occupation for

the record, please.
A:

Denise Bradfield.

I'm a police officer at the University of

Utah.
Q:

And with the University of Utah, is that correct?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Were you working on June 26 of this year?
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A:

Yes.

Q:

Approximately 2:45 in the morning of that June 26 did you

respond to the 100 Court of the University Building?
A:

Yes, I did.

Q:

Did you assist Officer LaFavre in the stop of a gold Trans

Am?
A:

I assisted after he had stopped the vehicle?

Q:

You did witness the defendant and the other passenger in the

car?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Had you heard the dispatch that sent Officer, you heard

Officer LaFavre testify as to the dispatch that sent him to the 100
Court, had you responded on the same dispatch?
A:

Yes, I did.

Q:

And did you observe the passenger in the gold Trans Am?

A:

At the scene of his stop, yes.

Q:

And did he appear to fit the description that had been

dispatched?
A:

To my opinion he did appear to fit the description.

Q:

Do you recall, was the passenger is the passenger in the

courtroom?
A:

Yes, he is.

Q:

Is he the gentleman that just testified?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Do you recall was he wearing his black leather jacket on

that night?
- 15 -

A:

I do not recall him wearing a jacket at all.

Q:

Do you recall him in a t-shirt?

A:

Yes.

Q:

I have no further questions.

JUDGE:

Cross examination.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
Q:

Officer Garfield when did you arrive at the scene?

A:

I arrived at the scene shortly before Officer LaFavre, I was

checking out an individual on foot before he made the stop.
Q:

And when did you arrive at the stop?

How long, and maybe

you don't know this just tell me if you don't, but how long had this
officer stopped the car before you arrived?
A:

I wouldn't be able to give you a time, but it was a short

period of time before I went.
Q:

Thank you.

RE-DIRECT
Q:

Were you present when the passenger and the defendant were

being questioned about what they were doing in the parking lot?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Did they at any time discuss the fact that they had been in

that vicinity?
A:

Yes, they did.

Q:

And they had been out of their car or they'd been in their,

did they appear to be the people you were looking for?
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A:

Yes, they did.

Q:

And you determined that there had been no damage done and

that' s why they were released?
A:

Yes.

Q:

No further questions.

ATD:

Therefore you determined that there was no vehicle burglary

or no car prowl at the scene.
A:

It was determined that the individual that we were looking

for was the passenger and that they had a valid reason for being in
that area.
Q:

In what area?

A:

The area of the West Village.

Q:

Did you ask him if he had been in the 100 Court area?

A:

Yes, we asked.

I did not ask but I was present when they

were asking, yes, when Officer LaFavre was asking him.
Q:

That will be all, thank you.

JUDGE:

Anything further from the State?

ATD:

Your honor, I want to call two rebuttle witnesses.

JUDGE:

What's the subject of the sir rebuttle?

ATD:

As to whether they were in the 100 Court area. Rich does

not remember which court it was.

I believe that if I question him

he'll say that he was not in the 100 Court area once he understands
the layout and I think Brenda can set-up the layout for us.

I'd, my

client can tell us, I don't want to put him on the stand.
ATP:

And I would simply argue that's not relevant really.

determined based on what they investigated that he was not the
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They

individual.

Whether it's the 100 Court or the 500 Court isn't really

what's relevant.

What's relevant is that they determined he was not

the individual or that he was the person they were looking for based
on his descriptions of where he'd been.
car prowl.

They determined there was no

This is a reasonable stop motion.

He's the person they

wanted to talk to and they stopped him for that purpose. We're kind
of getting lost in this.
JUDGE:

That's your position

ATD:

I believe Mr. Zollinger opened the door.

JUDGE:

I'm sorry.

ATD:

I believe Mr. Zollinger opened the door by asking what

happened after the stop by trying to put in facts that my that these
were the people they were looking for.

My position is is that Rich

is not the person they were looking for and Officer Garfield that
they determined that he was in the area.

The area was 100 Court. My

information is that they weren't on 100 Court.
ATP:

And again, my position would be her testimony was that her

subjective opinion was these were the people they'd been looking for.
Subjectiveness is what is necessary to be shown here on the part of
the officer for the reasonable suspicion to stop.
JUDGE:

But well how reasonable it is might depend.

Supposing the

dispatch gave a location. The suspect was found far away from that
location.
ATP:

That certainly goes to the reason

.

And it would if we were talking about far away. We're

talking about an exit from several courts.
JUDGE:

But I think that's probably, she has a right to present that
- 18 -

evidence that's relevant. Why don't we do it this way though
counsel.

I think you can call your client without subjecting him to

any other cross-examination except for the one subject you're going
to explore.

Do you want to do it that way?

ATD:

That would be fine if we can I just want it limited.

JUDGE:

Okay, I would limit cross-examination only to the general

area that you deal with on direct-examination.
ATD:

James on the 26th

JUDGE:

Pardon me, for the record could we establish who the witness

is.

CROSS - EXAMINATION
ATD:

I'm sorry.

Would you state your name for the record.

A:

James E. Case.

Q:

And what is your address?

A:

124 T Street.

Q:

On the 26th you were at the University Village.

JUDGE:

And that's the month of June?

ATD:

June 26th. You were at the University Village and what were

you doing there?
A:

Dropping off my girlfriend.

Q:

And what court does your girlfriend live in?

A:

800.

Q:

And at any time did you enter the 100 court?

A:

Well you have to drive by 100 to go to 800 and back out past

it to get back out.
- 19 -

Q:

Did you or Rich get out of the car in the 100 court?

A:

Just me. No, not in 100 in 800.

Q:

In 800 you got out of the car and where'd you walk?

A:

Just her to her door and back to the car and then leaving.

Q:

And Rich never got out of the car?

A:

No.

Q:

That's all.

JUDGE:

Cross.

ATP:

No, thank you.

JUDGE:

Nothing, you can have a seat.

ATD:

That will be everything for the defense.

JUDGE:

Alright, it's your motion so I'll give you that first

opportunity.
JUDGE:

Let me ask you this before you start. The critical issue is

obviously and I'll be willing to find at this point, Mr. Farnworth
who was the passenger who may or may not have been the subject of the
dispatch is male with all due respect it's fair to describe him and I
would as chunky.

He has medium brown hair I wouldn't say that

- 20 -

it's dark brown hair.

He's clearly not Hispanic.

I'd be willing to

find based on his testimony nothing to controvert it that he was
wearing a pink t-shirt not a white t-shirt on the evening in
question.

That he was wearing a jacket that was zippered in the

front which would expose some of the front of the t-shirt, but that
he was covering the shirt with the jacket.

So based on those finding

I think that the evidence preponderates that way.

I guess the legal

question is and I'll also I further find that even though Mr. Case
and Mr. Famworth had not stopped in the 100 Court even Mr. Case's
testimony was that they had to drive by 100 Court to get in and out
of the 800 Court area on their errand.

So I suppose the question is

how close does the description have to meet.

I think you would

stipulate wouldn't you counsel that if in fact Mr. Famworth had been
Hispanic if he had been wearing a white t-shirt that if he were this
close to the 100 Court block then there would be reasonable
suspicion, is that correct?
ATD:

No, your honor, I wouldn't stipulate to that because I

believe they needed the dispatch tape here.

I believe the dispatch

tape has to be there has to be we need to know who this informant
was.

Was this an anonymous tip or is it a citizen's call.

They

allow her to, just a minute I have to get my bearings,
JUDGE:

Sure.

ATD:

If you look at there's a lot of case law around this state

and we need to determine is this an inherently reliable tip. We
can't have citizen's using other people in this way and maybe they
wouldn't, but I think if you look at People v. Garcia, where an
- 21 -
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We

could have anytime we see someone on the street we could call the
police and the police would haves to come out. Maybe the dispatch
office knew that, but the City has not presented or bore their burden
on that.

In Citv of Wake Forest v. Dugan, again, they said it's the

burden of the facts the burden lies on the officer, the facts
available to the officer.

You heard him testify all he knew is a

chunky individual, Hispanic looking, with a white t-shirt.

Well,

maybe if we mix the two my client and Rich you might get that
description but separately we have a chunky individual wearing a pink
t-shirt and to my eye he doesn't look Hispanic to me.

I have other

cases if the court wants them, but the continuing theme is we have
specific cars, specific colors, specific suspect identification and
drivers licenses and most of these are DUI cases, and a driving
pattern or something more. Absent the driving pattern or criminal
behavior.
ATP:

The courts have overturned it said, we must suppress.

All of the cases she has cited to, your honor, refer to

stopping the individual that they intended to stop, subsequently
arresting him on the charge that the call was made on.

In this case

we're not anywhere near that. They stopped on an investigative stop
based on a reasonable call from an individual stating someone is out
in my parking lot.

If she expects that the court should require

citizen's screenings to be dealt with in the same fashion that a
prosecutor deals with screenings.

She's missed the mark.

There's no

court case out there that says that. The dispatcher has a duty to
determine the inherent reliability, the reliability of the call to
the best of their ability.

Over the telephone that's very
- 23 -

simple.
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die court Officer LaFavre did indicate that the individual was in a
t-shirt onl^ th*i- there was no jacket involved

I would also

indicate that the defendant's appearance at 3:00 o'clock in the

what the court has to look at not what we here in the light of day
can see, but what they a car passing by them leaving the area, that
they' re going to i nvestigate wou] d p e r c e i v e , 11;„"' i t" he i r percepticn
a n d it is their p e r c e p t i o n that of a r e a s o n a b l e officer.
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would another officer under the similar circumstances.
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That's what

Would another officer under similar circumstances have responded in a
like fashion.

I don't think there's any evidence at all before this

court to indicate otherwise. They both testified to the light
colored t-shirt, they both believe it was a white t-shirt.

And given

that that is the state of the law right now in Utah I don't believe
the court has any choice but to find there was reasonable suspicion
for the stop.
ATD:

Your honor, Mr. Zollinger is asking you to give more

credibility to the officers.
equally weigh the evidence.

In every jury trial we ask can you
I don't believe the officers' testimony

is any more credible than Mr. than Rich's. Rich, there's no evidence
that he lies.

There's nothing to doubt his credibility.

Further, I

think Roth our most recent Court of Appeals decision discusses the
reliability of the informant.

It goes into discussing why in Roth

the informant was reliable. We don't know anything about this
informant.

The Oregon Supreme Court stated:

We hold that an anonymous tip in this case has to have some
inditia of reliability in order for it to give rise to
reasonable suspicion.

I sense the overtones of Mr. Zollinger's argument is that this
something less than reasonable suspicion we need.

It's not.

It has

to be reasonable suspicion and I just don't think its here. Even
based on the facts if you want to skip the dispatch argument Rich
does not look Hispanic, he was wearing a pink t-shirt and he was
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caller inherently anyway

The reasonable inference

> someone

complained about a car prowler and the officers were called uo
investigate and I guess the first issue is seems to me your question
before the officers can stop anybody in response to a c3 ispatch call
t

E: i n £ o rma t i on

And I gii e s s t he

question is how much information do they have to have.

If someone

calls and reports a car prowl or a car burglary which is what a car
prowl u.., before !; he officer • ::a n

J an) b o d y I g i less they tuve t o

have a certain amount of information.

What is that?

A quantum,, of

information you have to have that seems to me to be the first issue
and then the second issue i s befoi e a stop can be reasonable how
closely to the description much the subject of the stop fit?
Obviously officers can't, go out when they're given a descript i on of
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the suspect and stop just anybody.

If the stop isn't reasonable I

would think both sides would agree to that.

Even in their own minds

they have some subjective reason for thinking gee maybe this person's
it even though he a lot different or she's a lot different from the
person that was described, the stop wouldn't be reasonable. There
has to be some objective standard to look at in saying no this was
the description given, this is the description of the subject of the
stop, how closely do they have to match?

And I'm not familiar with

any case that talks about that. That would seem to me to be the
focus of your research and I'd ask you if you would counsel to
prepare something and have it ready by let's see, the trial is set
for October the 14th so I'll ask you to be ready with something let's
say October the 5th and then Mr. Zollinger you can respond by the
13th.

We won't have time to have a reply memorandum submitted.

But

to focus on those two issues, and as I said the second one is my main
concern because this isn't really a tip this isn't someone calling
the police and saying hey look if you stop Mr. so and so you're going
to find some drugs. This is an actual call a complaint and it has
more of an emergency overtone and it would seem to me the police need
a lot less information before they can investigate that than they
would just that kind of a tip that it maybe your cases Ms. Kreeck
Mendez that you've referred to would deal with. But if you want to
look at that issue too.
ATD:

Alright.d

JUDGE:

So the deadlines are October the 5th and October the 13 for

a reply and then I'll give you my ruling sometime prior to the trial
- 27 -

and I suppose it may be dispositive depending on how 1 go.
SALT LAKE CITY i; JAMES CASE
TAPE NO. 2235
CASE NO. 925018713TC
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ATP: STEVEN ZOLLINGER
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unless there :. --something else from the two
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Anything e l s e ?

ATP:

No.

J [JDGEi

I'm going t o denv t-he motion t<~> s u p p r e s s anc

s p e c i f i c factual findings

Number

lit: ah po 1 1 ce o f £ i ce r Le f

rmo r a t
..

*ak» t->^ee

the U n i v e r s i t y
.

which means vehicle burglar, m* ^uiu..,i parking are. .r, * - .- , . *. c j^t
area of the University Village sometime after midnight whe : %- w.
still dark , That: the dispatcher gave Of £ i cei LeFev re a descr ipt

on

of the suspect a nd that description was of a chunky male, possibly
Hispanic, who was wearing a white t-shirt
give Officei LeE ev r e ox the other

.

The dispatcher di d not
-. iy other details , The

officer did not know who had phoned ,\ - - complaint to dispatch.
When approaching University Village the officer saw a car with a
passenger who I n the officer's
description of the dispatch,,
chunky

judgment appeared to match the
He thought that the passenger was

and Hispanic and was wearing a white 1: - shirt.
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The car that

the officer saw was not in the 100 court area, it was in the
proximity of the University Village, in fact, was coming out on the
Sunnyside Blvd. or street from University Village which was within
just a few blocks of University Village at the time the officer first
observed the car and the passenger.

The officer stopped the car,

approached the passenger who had given rise to the officer's
suspicion was a man by the name of Richard Farnsworth and Mr.
Farnsworth the court would find was at the time the officer made the
stop and is currently or is at least the time of the hearing number
1)

a male; 2) in the court's judgment would fit the description of

chunky, was about 5'6" according to his description 184 lbs., has
brown hair which is moderate to dark, not light brown hair not
necessarily black hair or deep black hair, but certainly moderate.
That Mr. Farnsworth is not Hispanic but does have a moderate
complexion, again, not particularly dark or particularly light. The
court would find that at the time of the stop Mr. Farnsworth was
wearing a pink light colored t-shirt which was covered by a dark
leather jacket, the jacket was partially zipped that even though Mr.
Farnsworth was seated in the vehicle the potion of the t-shirt, the
upper part of the t-shirt would have been visible for the officer to
make the stop.

The officer then who had stopped Mr. Farnsworth the

car that Farnsworth was riding in the court would find thought he was
stopping the subject of the dispatch.

To my mind that's critical.

In other words, he did not use the dispatch as a pretext

tc

stop the vehicle or he wasn't acting on some hunch. He thought that
the vehicle he was topping contained the subject of the dispatch
- 29 -

based on the description that the officer had been given.

The driver

of the car that Farnsworth was riding on is Mr, Case was arrested
subsequently for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol after other
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but it di d report two critical things.
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and the location of the ca r prowl and 2) provided information
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So I would find at least that the officer did have enough information
from the dispatch to act upon. He had reasonable suspicion based on
the dispatch-

The second question the big one I guess that was

really brought forward by the motion to suppress was did the officer
have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle?

In other

words, did he have sufficient objective articulable facts that the
passenger in the car was involved in criminal activity?

The officer

didn't know anything about the DUI at the time, he was stopping the
car because he thought the passenger may have been involved in a car
prowl.

And again I would find that the officer did and the officer

was responding to a legitimate complaint again not acting on some
hunch or pretext. Mr. Farnsworth was in the dark and at a distance
could have looked Hispanic with his dark hair and mustache.

He was

of a chunky build, he did have on a light colored I'll be it pink
t-shirt opposed to a white t-shirt which was visible to the officer
when Mr. Farnsworth was seated in the vehicle.

Mr. Farnsworth was

also in an area which was near the reported crime.

It was the

vehicle again was exiting University Village which is a short
distance from 100 court area. Based on this I would find that it was
not unreasonable for the police officer to stop the vehicle briefly
to investigate.

Therefore, I would find that the officer did have a

reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle and
investigate.

The investigation was brief.

That it was additional

facts after the stop that gave rise to the charge against

Mr. Case

and that those facts were within the plain view and smell of the
officer after he had legitimately stopped the car. So based on all
- 31 -
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ATD:

Y ouz honor, can I have a week?

JUDGE:

You want us to set it for trial again
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FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Officer

f

~c?vre was dispatched

to a suspected car provvi, ui veinc1" h -*-'
court of the University Village sometime after midnight.
2.

Kir Uispatchui y,i tv, Ulli

- .

wing description of the suspect:

a chui iky male, possibly Hispanic, wearing a white t-shirt. These were HIP r nil »
de tails provided by the dispatcher.
3.

Fht

4.

When approaching the University Village shc.. y ^...w,

<

••
U i0

dispatch the

^ w a car with a passenger who, in the officer's judgment, appeared * J

matcri nit: ut
hisoan'-c, aw* /, a- y^tarr c a light t sr

,: /

Rnrf

5.

At the time the officer first observed the car and the passenger they were

not in the 100 court area, but could have been driving away from that location.
6.

The officer stopped the car near the entrance to University Village on

Sunnyside Boulevard.
7.

After the officer stopped the car he approached the passenger, who had

given rise to the officer's first suspicion. The passenger was a man by the name
of Richard Farnsworth.
8.

Mr. Farnsworth is: male; fits the description of chunky, approximately 5'6"

184 lbs.; and has brown hair which is moderate to dark. Farnsworth is not
hispanic.
9.

At the time of the stop, Mr. Farnsworth was wearing a pink t-shirt which

was covered by dark leather jacket, the jacket was partially zipped. The upper
part of the t-shirt would have been visible to the officer, even though Mr.
Farnsworth was seated.
10.

The officer who stopped Mr. Farnsworth thought he was stopping the

subject of the earlier dispatch.
11.

Based on the description that the officer had received, it was reasonable to

think that the vehicle he was stopping contained the subject of the dispatch.
12.

The driver of the car that Mr. Farnsworth was riding in was Mr. Case.

13.

Mr. Case was arrested subsequently for Driving Under the Influence of

Alcohol after other evidence which was in plain view and plain smell gave rise to
additional suspicions which the officer then acted upon.
14.

Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth were at the University Village on legitimate

business. They had not burglarized any vehicles.
15.

Mr. Case and Mr. Farnsworth were originally in the 800 court area of the

University Village, but did drive near the 100 court area of the University Village
when exiting the area.
16.

Mr. Farnsworth did not actually get out of the car while at the University

Village.
17.

The officer's detention of Farnsworth was brief.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The officer did not use the dispatch as a pretext to stop the vehicle. He

thought that he was stopping the subject of the dispatch.
2.

The officer's stop of the vehicle was based on objective articulable facts

such that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the passenger, Farnsworth,
was involved in criminal activity. The passenger's appearance, and proximity to
the reported criminal activity, gave rise to that suspicion.

DATED this *2L3> day of December, 1992.

Robin W. Reese
Third Circuit Court Judge
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Office, 451 South 200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 this
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff,
V.

Case No. 925018713
JUDGE ROBIN W. REESE

JAMES B. CASE
Defendant.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
3.

The dispatch provided sufficient information on which
an officer could base reasonable suspicion to arrest
someone matching the dispatch description.
Specifically, the dispatch included:

and
DATED this

1)

alleged crime a car prowl,

2)

location of the car prowl,

3)

information regarding the suspect.

I '

day of January, 1993.

W

JL^L

ROBIN W. REESE
Third Circuit Court Judge

ADDENDUM D

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
1896

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden —
Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
1896

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect — Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public ofifense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
1980

